Wage ratios across di¤erent percentiles of the distribution have moved in parallel and then diverged in the U.S. in the last 50 years. I build a simple model of heterogeneous technology and workers that features complementarities in production and love-for-variety in consumption and identify the macro-, talent-and individual-speci…c components of the wage function. I build the theoretical counterparts of the observed wage ratios, and show that both skill-biased technical change and trade between identical countries can reproduce the observed pattern of wage dispersion. This fact arises from qualitatively similar local responses of the marginal vs. the total price of skills. I argue that intra-…rm rent distribution can be used to disentangle these causes.
and Kearney (2005) , (2006)). At extreme high values in the wage distribution, inequality started increasing in the sixties, and grew even more markedly (Piketty and Saez (2003) , (2004)) 1 .
There seems to be a consensus that an increase in demand biased toward skilled workers is at the origin of these facts, and that that much of the increase in inequality has been observed within sectors (see for example Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) ).
But what caused this increase, and how can we explain the non-monotonic behavior of the wage ratios?
Skill-biased technical change and trade integration are the two most prominent candidates for an explanation 2 . To sort them out, we need to be explicit about the distinctive aspects of each; to take a stance on their e¤ect on …rm-level outcomes; and to show how changes in wage ratios are generated in an economy with those features. This paper takes up these steps and ask the following two questions: 1) Can skill-biased technical change and trade integration produce the same observed pattern for inequality within a uni…ed framework? And if so, 2) Can …rm-level data help to disentangle the two causes? The answer to these questions are yes, and yes: by examining the equilibrium responses of the wage function in a heterogeneous population of workers and …rms, I show that the evolution of wage ratios described above can be rationalized independently by both the forces considered, and show what evidence needs to be provided to tell apart the two mechanisms. The neatness of the results is obtained at the price of strong reliance on functional form assumptions, which is admittedly in no way general, although often standard. However, it will be a virtue of the model the ability to clearly answer the questions posed.
To frame my argument, I consider two identical economies with a potentially unbounded mass of goods, where varieties are characterized by heterogeneous e¢ciencies in their technology, in the spirit of Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003) . I extend this framework by assuming that workers are heterogeneous in their ability to run any …rm (if they choose so), while they are identical as production workers at the …rms' production lines: a …rm is then made up by an idea, a manager, and production workers 3 . Complementarities between technology and ability 4 imply positive assortative matching between managers and technological e¢ciency 5 , producing a "superstars" e¤ect as in Rosen (1981) . The occupational choice implies that the wage of the manager if she was a production worker plays the role of the …xed selling cost in the domestic market, giving rise to increasing returns to scale at the …rm level (as in Krugman (1979) ). A …xed cost of exporting produces the endogenous selection of most productive …rms in the foreign market.
I model skill-biased technical change as an increase in the contribution of ideas to …rm-level productivity. While all …rms gain from this increase, complementarities in production ensure that better managers gain more than proportionately relative to average managers. Moreover, I model trade integration as a path of progressive reduction in trade costs between two identical countries: since trade has been mostly intra-industry, I shut down on purpose any motive for trade related to di¤erences in technology or endowments.
To answer the …rst question of this paper, I build the theoretical counterpart of wage ratios at two (arbitrary) levels of the skill spectrum and examine how this ratio moves following exogenous changes in the two relevant forces in the economy. Predictions on the response of wage ratios can always be reduced to predictions on local changes in inequality. The local change in inequality describes how the wage ratio moves for two abilities similar enough, s 0 and s 00 > s 0 . The wage of s 00 is simply the wage of s 0 plus the marginal price of skills: hence, the direction of the change in this wage ratio can be determined by comparing two elasticities, the elasticity of the total price of skills (i.e., the wage of s 0 ) and the elasticity of the marginal price of skills (i.e., the slope of the wage at s 0 ). Suppose that the latter is more responsive than the former: then, an exogenous shock that raises both the total and the marginal price of skills increases the ratio between the two wages and increases local inequality.
What are the consequences of skill-biased technical change and trade integration on local inequality? The …rst channel by assumption raises the value of every ability, but because of complementarities in production, managers with high ability gain disproportionately more than others; on the other hand, the improvement in the overall e¢ciency of the economy exerts a stronger competitive pressure uniformly on all …rms. With power law distributions for ideas and abilities, the marginal price of skills is always more responsive than the total price of skills. For low levels of abilities, they both decrease, but the former falls more, and local inequality decreases; for high levels of abilities, they are both larger, but the former raises more, and local inequality increases.
Trade integration in the form of reduction of iceberg transport costs also bene…ts …rms asymmetrically: while the domestic sellers must bear sti¤er competition from abroad, exporters face lower costs to sell their products in the foreign market. This argument is standard in all trade models with heterogeneous …rms. I show that the marginal price of skills is again more sensitive, and the same behavior of local changes in inequality is produced. In both cases, the level of wage is less sensitive than the marginal wage because part of the adjustment on the level is borne by pro…ts.
I can then answer positively to the …rst question because the wage ratio between two arbitrary levels of ability can always be expressed as the sum of all the local changes occurring between them, and these local change can have, in principle, any sign: if, for example, most of them are negative in the region between the 10 th and the 50 th percentile of workers, the ratio p50=p10 will decrease, be it for episodes of skill-biased technical change or for larger intra-industry trade. To the best of my knowledge, this is the …rst paper which to provide a link between the empirically observed evolution of wage ratios and a general equilibrium theory of the consequences of skill-biased technical change and intra-industry trade.
If skill-biased technical change and trade integration can both rationalize the pattern for inequality in the U.S. economy that the literature has documented, what can help tell the two causes apart? I focus on the intra-…rm rent distribution, where I call "rent" the sum of pro…ts and the manager's wage, less the opportunity cost of ideas and managers in the alternative occupation (zero and the production worker wage, respectively). I show that the intra-…rm rent distribution is not modi…ed by trade integration, which only a¤ects competitiveness and productivities across …rms. In equilibrium, in fact, the slope of the wage function (a marginal cost for the …rm) must re ‡ect the marginal bene…t of a better manager. In comparing two similar …rms, then, the fraction of the marginal rent captured by the better manager must be proportional to her contribution to the creation of that rent. Since the trade costs in ‡uence the marginal contribution of managers and ideas in the same way, their relative contribution cannot be a function of trade integration.
Hence, changes in inequality not accompanied by change in the intra-…rm rent distribution must be attributed to trade. Vice-versa, changes in the intra-…rm rent distribution must imply changes in local inequality caused by skill-biased technical change. This is the …rst paper to make a connection between intra-…rm rent distribution, and the consequences of intra-industry trade and skill-biased technical change.
The paper is consistent with the patterns identi…ed in the empirical literature on trade and …rm-level heterogeneity: exporting …rms are larger, more productive, and earn higher pro…ts; moreover, I add to the current literature a simple channel through which larger …rms also pay higher wages (Oi and Idson (1999) ), exporting …rms employ higher quality of workers and pay higher wages than …rms only selling on the domestic market (see for example Bernard and Jensen, (1995) , (1997), (1999)).
The hypotheses of the model allow the arguments in this paper to dodge the most common rejections of trade-based explanations for the evolution of inequality. Under the assumption that trade shifts the derived demand of skilled workers across sectors, Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) argue that the observed pattern of wage ratios is only consistent with skill-biased technical change 6 . On the other hand, Hanson (1996, 1999 ) …nd a signi…cant role for international trade when they consider the import content of …rms' intermediate inputs: a shift in demand away from unskilled and toward skilled workers within sectors occurs when …rms respond to competition from low-wage countries by outsourcing abroad tasks intensive in unskilled labor. In any case, the common denominator of this debate is that 6 This position is also supported by the fact that the increase in relative demand of skilled workers has been larger where computing technology has spread faster (Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) ). In particular, computers are argued to be substitute for unskilled and complementary to skilled workers: hence, rates of computer adoption should be correlated with rates of skill-upgrading across industries. Empirically, rates of skill-upgrading within industries explain most of the increase in demand of college workers.
trade ‡ows are mainly driven by di¤erences in the price of factors across countries.
Although this channel has gained relevance in recent years with the rise of China and other developing countries (see the discussion in Krugman (2008) ), intra-industry trade has been very important since long before 7 . I then analyze a progressive reduction of variable trasportation costs between two perfectly identical economies. This focus shuts down by construction motives for international trade based on relative di¤erences in factor endowments (as in the classic HeckscherOhlin framework) and the associated distributional e¤ects based on di¤erences in relative factor intensities across goods (Stolper-Samuelson e¤ects) 8 . Since trade ‡ows are not generated by comparative advantage, rejections grounded on the reallocation of employment shares across sectors do not apply to this framework.
The model is consistent with the mechanisms used by Gabaix and Landier (2008) to describe the surge in CEO compensation in the last decades: this framework endogenizes the response of the size distribution of …rms to di¤erent exogenous shocks. Also, it shows that a divergent behavior in the upper and lower tails of the wage distribution can be produced even when changes in the labor force composition (Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005) ) are absent. The elasticity of total and marginal prices of skills are all that matter, and when one considers only data on the wage distribution, these e¤ects are di¢cult to disentangle. The closest paper to this study is Costinot and Vogel (2009) , who build a model of complementarities in production capable of addressing the consequences of technological change, North-North and North-South trade on the wage function of heterogeneous workers. Their analysis has less restrictive hypotheses, and allows for skill-and task-upgrading and downgrading, i.e., changes in the assignment function between workers and tasks: in the present paper, this possibility is shut down by the power law assumptions on the ideas and abilities' distribution. However, their model has still no motive for trade between two identical countries. Moreover, the mass of goods (in their model, tasks) is …xed and there is no notion of selection into the home market. This result is driven -compared to the present study -by the absence of an occupational choice of workers between production and managerial activities: as a consequence, skill-biased technical change cannot then produce a divergent pattern for wage ratios in di¤erent regions of the ability spectrum. Finally, their model does not capture the well-documented selection of subsets of …rms into the export 7 For example, Baldwin and Martin (1999) document that two-thirds of contemporary world trade occurs among rich countries with similar factor endowments, and three-fourths of this share is two-way trade within narrowly de…ned industries. See also Helpman (1999) , for a discussion. The rise in the share of trade in manufactured goods with developing countries is not to be ignored, but is too recent to account for the evolution of inequality starting the sixties. Moreover, an Hecksher-Ohlin-based explanation would predict a reduction in the skill premium in China, which is counterfactual. 8 A similar approach is undertaken in Epifani and Gancia (2008) , who consider the case of two goods with di¤erent skill intensity, homogeneous …rms and no choice between skilled and unskilled occupations. market, and only compares autarky and free-trade equilibria when North-North trade is driven by di¤erences in factor diversity 9 across countries. This paper is also related to Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2009). Their paper focuses on the relation between trade, search and screening costs, and unemployment. Contrary to this model, it features …rms with many heterogeneous matches to workers that are ex-ante identical. However, the consequences of skill-biased technical change are not addressed. Moreover, heterogeneity in wages arises because labor market frictions give ex-ante identical workers a bargaining power within the …rm; changes in exogenous parameters of the model spur a reshu-ing of the quality of the matches that make impossible to track the outcome for speci…c workers. In this paper, heterogeneity in wages is simply a consequence of assortative matching and of demand and supply at each skill level, and it is persistent in response to exogenous shocks.
Also related to this study is Verhoogen (2008) , who proposes a partial equilibrium framework where wage inequality among heterogeneous workers in developing countries increases following trade integration: the reason is that an increase in the demand for product quality raises the demand of more skilled workers because of complementarities between input quality and output quality. This mechanism limits its usefulness in discussing trade among identical countries.
I see the present study as complementary to this literature in the endevour to better understand how international trade generates interdependence across labor market outcomes of di¤erent countries.
In the rest of the paper, I will describe the model in closed economy (section 2) and provide a motivation for the theoretical framework used in analyzing wage ratios, applying this to skill-biased technical change (section 3). In section 4, I extend the model to an open economy framework, while in section 5 I show how wage ratios respond to skill-biased techical change and trade integration. Section 6 argues why the intra-…rm rent distribution can help in disentangling the two causes, skill-biased technical change and trade integration. Section 7 provides some conclusive remarks.
The Closed Economy

Consumers, Managers, and Ideas
The representative consumer maximizes a standard CES utility function where, from an in…nite mass of varieties potentially available, a subset J of them is produced and aggregated as
with 1: Standard optimization implies that each consumer will spend
Factor diversity captures the relative abundance of agents with extreme abilities, be them very low or very high.
on each variety produced, where
is the ideal price index of good Y and X is total consumers' expenditure on it.
To …x ideas, we think of di¤erent j as di¤erent varieties; however, I will interchangeably use the term "…rm", implicitly assuming one product per …rm.
Three inputs are necessary for a production line to exists: an idea, a manager, and production workers in proportion to output.
Varieties di¤er according to the status of the technology available for their production: denoting with z 2 (0; 1) the quality of an idea, I assume that there is a measure G (z) = T z z (with z 1)
of ideas at least as good as z. This speci…cation ensures that there is a su¢cient number of ideas, however bad, to accomodate any number of managers in equilibrium. Ideas are owned by a mutual fund that maximizes pro…ts and redistributes them equally across agents 10 .
The economy is populated by a mass L of agents, which, as in Lucas (1978) , can be either production workers or managers. Agents are heterogeneous in their mangerial ability, while they all have a unit e¢ciency as production workers. The ability s is also distributed according to a power law: for s 1, there is a measure L (s) = Ls s ( s 1) of potential managers with ability of at least s. While in Lucas (1978) potential managers di¤er by their ability to run larger …rms producing a homogeneous …nal product, here I assume that there are complementarities between managerial ability and idea e¢ciency. In particular, if production with an idea of e¢ciency z is run by a manager s, the total …rm's productivity is ' (z; s) = z s with > 0, > 0. 11 Note that by suitably rede…ning units and parameters in the productivity, we can always write the distribution of ability as having a shape parameter of 1, and still recover the same distribution for s , which is what matters for the productivity of the …rm; the same is true for the parameter z on the distribution of ideas' e¢ciency. The parameters s and z will then be set to 1 without loss of generality 12 . The parameter uniquely measures the in ‡uence of managers' ability: while = 0 reduces this model to a simple one-sided heterogeneity framework, 1 0 The assumption of equal redistribution is immaterial to the rest of the paper, since I am only interested in wage (rather than income) distribution. Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) discuss relative merits of these two alternatives. 1 1 This assumption satis…es log-supermodularity as in Costinot (2007) . 1 2 More precisely, suppose that G (z) = T z z ; in this case, the distribution of z satis…es T Pr fz > ag = T a z = . We want to show that there are az and~ such that the measure of ideasz better than any value a is T a 1 and that still assigns toz~ the same distribution that z has. Letz z z , and~ = = z . Hence, the measure of ideas z better than a is T Pr fz > ag = T Pr z z > a = T a 1 :z has a distribution with shape parameter 1. Moreover,
which is then equal to the distribution of z . An analogous argument, withs s s and~ = = s , establishes the equivalence for the population of managers. Finally, since z and s have the same distribution asz~ ands~ , it must also be true that the product of these two variables,z~ s~ , has the same distribution as z s .
increasing lets a …rm gain from a better manager. Moreover, there is a simple mapping between abilities and percentiles in the skill and wage distributions: the ability s is always collocated at the 100(1 s 1 ) th percentile.
Agents who choose to be production workers earn a wage w, which is then also the opportunity cost of being a manager. This wage is the numeraire and will be normalized to 1; I leave it here explicitly for clarity. When y units of good are to be produced, y=' e¢ciency units of work from production workers are used at a cost of wy=' in total. Denote as:
the surplus of the …rm with overall productivity ', i.e. the excess of revenues over costs for production workers, when the price p is chosen. For any manager s, a …rm with idea quality z sets a price which solves
For any given quality z, the optimal price is then a function of the quality of the manager s the owner of z chooses. The way in which the market balances incentives across …rms is the subject of the next section.
Assignment
Substituting the revenue function (2.1) and the optimal price (2.2) in the expression for v (p; '), the surplus for a …rm (z; s) is rewritten as
The term M is a measure of the economically relevant size of the market. A larger expenditure level X, or weaker competition through higher average price P all make the market bigger and tend to raise the surplus for any …rm.
This surplus must cover payments to the manager of ability s, residually determining pro…ts for the idea z. The complementarity between managers and ideas -which drives the incentive to positive assortative matching -is manifest in the cross derivative of the surplus v 1;2 (z; s) being positive: a marginal increase in the quality of ideas always enhances the total net value of production, but this enhancement is larger when the manager running the …rm is better. This complementarity creates an incentive for better …rms to hire better managers, or equivalently, for more able managers to choose better …rms. The assignment between managers and …rms is non-random. The ideas' owner problem is then
Following Sattinger (1979) , I assume that a …rm is unable to a¤ect the prevailing market conditions, so that the wage function is taken as given: the optimal ability s will be chosen to balance the marginal bene…t of a better manager (higher productivity and larger surplus available for distribution) with the marginal costs of it (higher wage demanded). In an optimum,
gives a condition that can be used to trace out the wage function when the left hand side is evaluated at the idea quality z which chooses s optimally, i.e., at z = z (s).
To build the equilibrium wage function, I will then proceed under the tentative assumption of positive assortative matching, z 0 (s) > 0, and prove that this must be true in equilibrium because of complementarities in production. If the best managers work running …rms with the best ideas, the assignment problem will imply (matching the measures at the right tail of the distributions)
under our assumptions. The parameter t, which we take as exogenous, is a measure of relative size of technology available in the country. A larger population size increases the availability of managers at all levels of ability, so that any idea z is matched with a better s; any potential manager gets hurt by a larger L, though, since this increases the mass of people better than her 13 .
Di¤erentiating then the surplus (2.3) with respect to s, plugging z (s) from (2.5) in it, and substituting the resulting v 2 (z (s) ; s) in (2.4) we obtain
This equation gives the equilibrium marginal rent for managers of di¤erent ability: its elasticity to di¤erent stimuli will play a crucial role in determining how inequality responds. Integrating over s, and using the fact that the marginal manager -denote her s c -must be indi¤erent between occupations, we get:
and with w (s) = w below s c .
The pro…t function (z) must then be the di¤erence between the surplus and the wage, and leaves the marginal idea z c indi¤erent to the alternative of not being used. To …nd the equilibrium pro…t value, I use the optimal assignment function (2.5) and (2.6), and the fact that marginal idea z c must have zero pro…ts, to get
with (z) = 0 below z c 14 .
The su¢cient condition for an optimum will require, when looking at the choice of manager z, that v 22 (z; s) w 00 (s) < 0 when z = z (s) (i.e., along the optimal assignment), which can be easily shown to be true by di¤erentiating (2.4) again with respect to s, and then plugging in the assignment function: the complementarity assumption v 12 (z; s (z)) > 0 ensures that positive assortative matching emerges as an equilibrium outcome 15 .
The equilibrium assignment of managers to …rms provides a simple microfoundation for the rent sharing between managers and ideas within a …rm, based on local scarcity of talents vs. ideas' and their contributions to the total productivity of the …rm. The rent to be shared is v (s ; z (s)) w, the excess of surplus over the sum of managers and ideas' opportunity cost ( w and 0 respectively).
The share of this rent going to managers' wages is + If managers do not in ‡uence the …rm's e¢ciency ( = 0), the rent for talent is zero, the equilibrium wage function reduces to the outside option, and we are back to the standard one-sided heterogeneity case similar to Melitz (2003) , where workers' contributions are homogeneous and the wage per e¢ciency unit is ‡at across ability levels. On the other hand, if = 0 we recover a model similar to Lucas (1978) and Manasse and Turrini (2001) , where heterogeneous workers are operating using homogeneous ideas: pro…ts then are zero, and only a non-trivial wage function remains.
If complementarities exist in production, the distribution of each factor determines both the rent-sharing and the …nal productivity distribution of …rms; in other words, making assumptions on 1 4 This is not the only way to characterize the earning functions. Since the problem is symmetric in managers and ideas, we could have started with the managers taking as given the pro…t function (z) and choosing ideas. Alternatively, we could have had each side choosing the other (as Sattinger (1979) ), particularizing each constant of integration with the relevant outside option. 1 5 The second order condition for the optimality of s in the …rm problem requires v22 (z; s) w 00 (s) < 0. Di¤eren-tiating (2.4) again with respect to s we get w 00 (s) = v22 (z; s) + v12 (z; s) z 0 (s), which implies w 00 (z) v22 (z; s) = v12 (z; s) z 0 (s). Using (2.3), we have
both the productivity distribution of …rms and rent sharing is equivalent to making a statement on the degree of heterogeneity of each factor. Observationally, this framework provides a link between …rm size distribution and the share of rent which goes to each factor type.
For some purposes, one could go further, simply assuming a …rm-level heterogeneity in ' and an ad-hoc rent splitting in constant shares. Such an approach would sidestep the description of the market mechanism underlying the assignment problem, at the cost of obscuring its economic content. For the purpose of this study, however, we cannot simply assume an exogenous …rm-level productivity distribution and arbitrary rent-sharing proportions. As I will argue below, a proper way to think about skill-biased technical change is to keep …xed the distribution of managers' ability, while changing the e¤ective distribution of idea quality through increases in . When this happens, not only does the share of rents to managers decrease, but the overall …rm productivity distribution improves: studying the e¤ect of a change in the share parameter we would miss the second part, while only studying an increase in the …rm-level heterogeneity parameter we would ignore the former.
Equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium in a closed economy, it is su¢cient to determine the cuto¤ s c for managers' ability and the expenditure level X in the economy. Note …rst that using the price index de…nition, the individual …rm price (2.2) and the assignment function (2.5), and assuming ( + ) ( 1) < 1, the price index has the form
where the assumption ( + ) ( 1) < 1 is needed to ensure that the joint knowledge embodied in ideas and people never implies the existence of a few …rms e¢cient enough to bring down the price index P to zero. Note that a larger relative measure of technology t reduces the price of the …nal good aggregate Y .
The expenditure on production workers for each …rm is x (') v (') ; using the expression for revenues (2.1), surplus (2.3), the assignment function (2.5) and the price index (2.8), and integrating over all active …rms, we get that the overall expenditure on production workers is 1 X:
On the supply side, when s c is the managers' cuto¤, L 1 s 1 c e¢ciency units are provided for production. Equating total wages of production workers to total expenditure over them by …rms, we get
This curve describes an equilibrium relation in the labor market. When s c ! 1, total earnings of production workers are zero, and so must be the expenditure X, while as s c ! 1, all agents are Figure 2 .1: This …gure shows the equilibrium determination of the cuto¤ s c and the expenditure level X in closed economy. The labor market equilibrium represents the locus of pairs (s c ; X) where expenditure over and income of production workers are equalized; the zero cuto¤ earnings is the locus of points where the surplus of the marginal …rm (s c ; z (s c )) exactly covers the sum of outside options, so that there is no incentive for entry or exit in the di¤erentiated sector.
employed as production workers, and total expenditure on them approaches a …nite constant; the monotonic increase in s c is inherited by the properties of the CDF.
In addition to production labor market clearing, we need to make sure that the …rm (s c ; z (s c ))
is made up by factors indi¤erent between production of varieties in Y and their alternative employment. This condition requires the surplus function (2.3) to be equal to the sum of the outside options for the indi¤erent pair of agents; using the assignment relation (2.5) and the price index
This equation is a "zero cuto¤ earnings" condition. As s c ! 1 the right-hand side becomes a strictly positive and …nite number, while as s c grows toward in…nity, this curve goes to zero. Hence, as shown in Figure 2 .1, the equilibrium (s c ; X) is always uniquely determined.
The simple functional form assumed allows to solve explicitly for s c in terms of parameters: equating (2.10) and (2.11), and using the de…nition (2.9) for , we have
where we note that the equilibrium cuto¤ is only a function of the sum of contributions of ideas and managers.
Having established the equilibrium conditions, we can also rewrite the earning functions in more explicit terms. Using the assignment function (2.5) to express the surplus (2.3) in terms of s, and imposing equality to w for the marginal …rm, we have that
Substituting the LHS out in the expressions for wages (2.6) and pro…ts (2.7), we can rewrite them as
Using the expression for s c in (2.12) in the price index (2.8), we can express the pro…t and wage function above the cuto¤ in real terms only as a function of parameters, as (z) =P and w (s) =P above the cuto¤s, and 0 and P 1 below, respectively. The equilibrium wage function is then determined jointly by the distribution of abilities and technology through a market mechanism which prices the relative scarcity of each type of agent.
The structure of the real earning functions has some characteristic elements.
The inverse of the price index gives a measure of the opportunity cost of keeping agents employed as production workers: in fact, their real wage is exactly P 1 , after normalizing w to 1.
The parameter represents a talent-speci…c component: total real rents in the …rm
are split giving a share to managers and a share 1 to ideas. For example, if = 0, managers do not contribute to the overall productivity distribution, and the share of rents going to managers is zero, and the wage reduces to w for all abilities.
A microeconomic component, s=s c and z=z c , determines then income di¤erences between different levels of ability within managers, and within ideas.
In the next section, I use this framework to evaluate the consequences of skill-biased technical change on the wage ratio at di¤erent percentiles in the wage distribution.
in s 16 . This is the only way in which, in this model, skill-biased technical change can be modeled.
An increase in would amount to a change in the distribution of abilities, which instead we want to keep …xed. An increase in productivity proportional to all …rms, say from s z to s z , with > 1; is equivalent to an increase in the e¢ciency of production workers, and would not be skill biased: the elasticity of the productivity to is 1 for all …rms 17 .
This discussion also makes clear why we need a market mechanism and two distributions of heterogeneous agents, rather than an exogenous rent splitting between them: we think of skillbiased technical change as a¤ecting a …xed ability distribution, which implies both an improvement in the assignment and a change in the overall distribution of productivities. A change in the rent-splitting parameter would ignore the latter aspect.
Empirically, the skill-biased technical change hypothesis is rooted in a positive correlation between adoption of computer-based technologies, skill-upgrading, and rising wage premia for education within and across …rms and industries (see Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998) for a discussion and further references, and Card and DiNardo (2002) for a critique). This hypothesis has also been rationalized arguing that it impacts asymmetrically routine and non-routine tasks, thereby providing testable implications on the composition and shifts of job tasks over time (Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)). My formulation captures these arguments in a simple model.
Since the distribution of abilities is …xed, there is a one-to-one correspondence between any ability level s and a percentile in the wage distribution, 100(1 s 1 ). The analysis can then focus on the elasticity to of w (s 00 ) =w (s 0 ), with s 00 > s 0 . Consider …rst two agents with very similar levels of ability. The di¤erence in their wage is essentially the marginal price of skills at s 0 , so that the wage ratio is just 1 + w s (s 0 ) =w (s 0 ). When the marginal price of skills is more elastic to than is the wage, skill-biased technical change increases the premium for the ability di¤erence w s (s 0 ) proportionally more than the price of ability w (s 0 ) (i.e., the wage at s 0 ). The wage ratio w (s 00 ) =w (s 0 ), which in this case is a measure of local inequality, increases.
More generally, the change in the wage ratio between two ability levels s 0 and s 00 can always be thought of as the "sum" of all the local changes intervening between them. The formal argument (relegated to Appendix A.1) shows that the local change in inequality at s when changes is
where w (s) = @w (s) =@ and w s (s) = @ 2 w (s) = (@ @s). The function ( ) (s) is the di¤erence between the elasticity of the marginal price of skills and the elasticity of the total price of skills.
For two ability levels s 0 and s 00 , with s 00 > s 0 , the elasticity of the wage ratio w (s 00 ) =w (s 0 ) to is 1 6 For example, at t = = 1 a 1% increase in raises the productivity of a …rm employing a top 10% manager by 1.61 percentage points more than the median …rm (in fact, ln (s 00 =s 0 ) = ln (10=2) = 1:61). 1 7 In fact, it is as if to produce y units of goods, we move from a requirement of y=' to a requirement of y= ( ') e¢ciency units of unskilled labor. Note also that the same argument applies to proportional changes of z: if we assume that the productivity is s ( z) and then increase , this is still equivalent to a proportional increase in the e¢ciency of production workers of .
simply
The total change in inequality between s 0 and s 00 is the integral of the local changes in inequality, weighted by w s (s) =w (s), a positive and unitless measure of the importance of ability di¤erences.
When for some s, ( ) (s) > 0, the local contribution of s is to increase all the wage ratios that contain it, and vice-versa.
Any argument about the behavior of wage dispersion is essentially a speci…cation of eq. (3.1) ; the framework here proposed simply provides one. I now examine in detail how skill-biased technical change a¤ects ( ) (s).
Skill-Biased Technical Change and Wage Ratios
At the economy-wide level, skill-biased technical change raises the contribution of ideas to the productivity of all …rms. However, any …rm, holding constant its productivity, faces now a sti¤er competition for its product. If s c is the indi¤erent manager at expenditure level X c , eq. (2.11)
shows that a larger expenditure is necessary for her to stay in the managerial occupation: the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings curve in Figure 2 .1 shifts up. Since the market for production workers is not directly a¤ected by this change, selection is stricter among managers: the worst white collar managers become blue collar.
Having described how a¤ects exit from the di¤erentiated sector, I can characterize the behavior of the local change in inequality.
The elasticity of the wage to (the second term in (3.1)) is determined by the interaction of three e¤ects. Eq. (2.14) shows that an increase in a¤ects the wage through (i ) the change in the share of rents going to managers, (ii ) the e¤ect of selection, and (iii ) the e¤ect of assignment 18 .
The …rst term captures a negative "share" e¤ect: for a …xed rent level in the …rm, the share of it going to managers decreases, because technology now contributes more overall to di¤erences in …rm-level productivities. The second term captures a negative "selection" e¤ect: since the rent level is just the integral of the marginal rents from the worst …rm upwards, when the worst agent select out of the market (we already saw that @s c =@ > 0) the total rent decreases. The third term represents an "assignment" e¤ect, and is always positive: any manager gains from a larger contribution of z to the productivity of the …rm; since the change is biased towards better agents, the assignment will grow in importance as s grows.
The elasticity to of the marginal price of skill w s (s) (the …rst term in (3.1)), on the other hand, is not directly in ‡uenced by the share of rents going to managers, since is a¤ecting in the same proportion both w s (s) and its change when increases: the share e¤ect is absent. However, skill-biased technical change tends to reduce the elasticity to of the marginal price of skills through selection, and to increase it through assignment. Simple calculations show that ( ) (s) is positive 1 8 The e¤ect of on the opportunity cost, which goes through real wages, is always canceled because we are considering wage ratios, so that [w (s
if and only if
and g 0 i (s) > 0 for i = 1; 2. For managers bad enough, the assignment and share e¤ects are negligible, and the negative selection e¤ect dominates. Its impact is greater (more negative) on the marginal price of skills: the selection e¤ect determines the wage elasticity only to the extent managers participate to the creation of surplus (in fact, g 2 (s) ! 0 as ! 0). Overall, the marginal price of skills falls proportionately more than the wage, so that the wage ratio between two close managers becomes smaller: the change in local inequality is negative.
For good enough managers, the assignment e¤ects dominates the other two, but again, only a fraction g 2 (s) of it impacts the elasticity of the wage. Hence, for abilities high enough, skill-biased technical change increases the marginal price of skills proportionately more than the wage: for two close managers the ratio of wages will then increase, and the contribution of local inequality will be positive.
Note also that if the selection e¤ect is close to zero, the region with negative local change in inequality tends to vanish, which means that selection is necessary for the inequality to decrease among bad managers.
Proposition 1 (proven in Appendix A.2) formally states this result: Proposition 1. There exists a unique skill level s ( ) > s c such that the local change in inequality from skill-biased technical change is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., ( ) (s) 0 , s s ( ) .
With these results in hand, it is possible to rationalize a divergent pattern in the percentile The latter is already evident: local inequality increases for all s > s ( ) , and the percentile ratio will increase at any pair of points in the ability distribution above the threshold, and in particular, at very high percentiles in the tail. To rationalize the former, it is su¢cient to note that we can pick s 0 < s 00 < s c , and s 000 > s ( ) to produce a constant ratio in the lower part of the income distribution (w (s 00 ) =w (s 0 )) and an increasing ratio in the upper part (w (s 000 ) =w (s 00 )); or, s c < s 0 < s 00 < s ( ) in the lower part and s 000 > s ( ) to obtain one decreasing and one increasing wage ratio at di¤erent percentiles in the distribution.
The Open Economy
I now introduce the framework and show the equilibrium determination when 2 identical countries are allowed to trade with each other. Assuming identical countries is appropriate since we want to think of intra-industry trade as a source of inequality, and to do so it is necessary to neutralize di¤erences in factor endowments or technologies.
In what follows, I lay out the main modi…cation to the framework in an open economy; then I
show how the equilibrium is determined.
Framework
I assume that a …rm needs to produce units of a good for 1 unit to reach the foreign destination, and that f units of production workers are needed to sell in the export market. If the price of …rm ' is p (') in the domestic market, it will be p (') abroad. The surplus from sales on the domestic and export markets are given respectively by:
where v i , with i = d; x; indicates the surplus reaped by a …rm selling in the domestic and in the export market, respectively, and M Following these steps, simple calculations deliver the earning functions in each country:
To connect the selection of domestic and foreign sellers, I set the surplus in (4.1) and (4.2) to w and 0, respectively, to characterize s d and s x ; substituting the assignment function (2.5), solving both expressions for M and equating them,
where I assume that 1 f 1=(1 ) > 1 in order to generate the empirically relevant pattern of partitioning in the export behavior of …rms, i.e., s x > s d .
This equation allows us to write the price index as a simple function of the domestic cuto¤. In fact, since
we can use (4.5) to eliminate s x and get:
where is an index of distance between the two economies. While the general structure of the price index re ‡ects its shape in closed economy (eq. (2.8)), the additional term (1 + 1= ) 1=( 1) shows how competition from abroad lowers the price index at home. In particular, note that heterogeneity in both skill and technology contribute to e¤ectively reduce the distance between the two countries (as + grows, becomes smaller). The relative size of ideas vs. population t lowers the price index only in proportion to the importance of the assignment: as ! 0, ideas play no role in the productivity, sorting is immaterial, and t no longer a¤ects P .
Equilibrium
In an open economy, equilibrium will require for each country: (i ) indi¤erence for the marginal agent s d between alternative occupation, (ii ) equilibrium in the market for production workers, and (iii ) trade balance.
The indi¤erence of a …rm to sell on the domestic market or shut down (condition (i )) simply requires the surplus in the domestic market given in (4.1) to be equal to the sum of the outside options w and 0 when evaluated at s d and z d ts d : Substituting in such equality the expression for the price index (4.6), using (4.5) and rearranging, we get
This equation is the open economy equivalent of (2.11), the Zero Cuto¤ Earnings: it shows how competition from abroad a¤ects occupational choices. Stronger trade integration (lower ) makes competition sti¤er, lowering the price index and increasing the real wage for production workers:
at any expenditure level X, the cuto¤ agent s d must be better to compete in her own market.
Equating total income of production workers to total expenditure of …rms on them (condition (ii )) we obtain L w 1 s
The right-hand side of this expression is found integrating separately labor demand for domestic and export sales, and including the …xed requirement to sell abroad, f w, in proportion to the mass of exporters Ls 1
x . Substituting (4.5) into (4.9) and rearranging, As economies become more integrated, more workers are demanded to pay the …xed costs of export ( decreases), and a lower level of overall expenditure X is needed to equilibrate demand and supply of production workers.
To close the model, we need to make sure that these conditions are compatible in the world economy: if trade balance has to be satis…ed (condition (iii )), this entails a relation between the relative wage of production workers in the two economies. When countries are identical, this ratio is simply 1.
Equations (4.8) In equilibrium, the market size M can be written, using the assignment function (2.5) in the surplus (4.1) and imposing equality to w, as
We can use this expression and the equation (1 ) 
The real earnings can easily be obtained dividing by the price index (4.6). Below the cuto¤s, we still have (z) =P = 0 and w (s) =P = P 1 .
All the components identi…ed in the closed economy case are present, suitably modi…ed, in the open economy. The macro-economic component, P 1 , and the type-speci…c component enter in a similar way. The existence of an export market now raises the marginal price of skills for managers good enough to access it.
In the next section, I use this model to compare the consequences of skill-biased technical change and trade integration on wages ratios in di¤erent regions of the income distribution.
Implications for Wage Dispersion
As discussed in the Introduction, the recent evolution of the wage distribution can be characterized by a divergent pattern for wage ratios in the lower vs. the upper tail, and an increase in the dispersion on the right tail of the wage distribution. I now ask if, for given contribution of managers to the productivity of the …rm, trade integration and skill-biased technical change can both rationalize this pattern. I will prove that this is indeed the case, and in the process I will show that -even in this highly stylized model -it is possible to have trade integration reducing the local inequality at all levels of ability, and techical change exhibiting a quite complex pattern of local changes: this fact emphasizes the necessity of being explicit about the interaction of skill-biased technical change and openness.
Skill-Biased Technical Change and Inequality
The basic components determining the direction of the local change in inequality (see eq. (3.1)) are unaltered when countries are allowed to trade: we still have to compare the elasticity of the marginal price of skill to the elasticity of the wage with respect to a change in . The di¤erence lies in the latter term, which varies according to the export status. In particular, denoting g i 2 (s) the weight on selection and assignment e¤ects for domestic sellers (i = d) and exporters (i = x), the local change in inequality is positive if and only if
and g 1 (s) (w (s) 1) =w (s), as in (3.2). The analysis of each of these terms exactly mirrors the discussion in the closed economy section.
The elasticity of the marginal price of skills (left-hand side) is una¤ected by the export status.
Conditional on exporting (i = x), the elasticity of the wage to (right-hand side) now incorporates the additional …xed cost necessary to sell abroad. A larger …xed cost tends to reduce the level of skill rent (see eq. (4.14)) and hence to increase the percentage impact of any given change in on w (s). For this reason, the selection and assignment e¤ects receive a larger weight for exporters than for domestic sellers, i.e., g
The share e¤ect, operating on a given rent, is not changed.
Note that while g d 2 (s) 2 ( ; 1) always, …xed costs can be large enough (i.e., 1
which is true if and only if f > = ) to imply g x 2 (s) > 1. In this case, the selection and the assignment e¤ect are stronger on the elasticity of the wage to (right-hand side) than on the elasticity of the marginal price of skills (left-hand side). In order to answer the question of this paper, whether or not the observed behavior on wage ratios can be rationalized both by skill-biased technical change and trade integration, it is su¢cient to focus on the case in which g x 2 (s) < 1. I will maintain this restriction throughout the rest of the paper, although I will brie ‡y discuss what happens when it is not satis…ed 19 . When Assumption 1 is not satis…ed (f < = ), the assignment and selection e¤ects are proportionally more important on the level of the wage than on the marginal wage. In this case, it is still true that for the worst domestic sellers local inequality decreases, while it increases for the best exporters. However, it is possible to show that the threshold is no longer necessarily unique: we can have two ability levels s ( ;d) and s ( ;x) , for domestic sellers and exporters respectively, above which local inequality increases, and below which it decreases. This is a case where (i ) the best domestic sellers are good enough for the assignment e¤ect to overcome the other two: as increases, the the total price of skills is less sensitive than the marginal price, and the local change in inequality is positive; and (ii ) at the same time, for some of the worst exporters …xed costs are high enough to make the total price of skills more sensitive to than the marginal price: for them the local change in inequality is negative 21 .
Trade Integration and Inequality
In this section I adapt the conceptual framework introduced above to evaluate the e¤ect of trade integration on the evolution of wage ratios. In this experiment, I will model trade integration as reduction in the proportional transportation cost . Following steps analogous to what we did before to analyze episodes of skill-biased technical change (as in Appendix A.1), we can then write 1 9 At aggregate level, Assumption 1 is placing a lower bound on the ratio between rents to ideas and rent to managers. Total rents for managers (wages less opportunity costs) can be written as W = L s 
Hence, =W = = . 2 0 In particular, there is a non-trivial interval of values for where this state occurs: in other words, s ( ) = sx is not a knife-edge case (see Proof of Proposition 2). 2 1 Since a complete taxonomy of the cases is not the objective of this paper, and divergent patterns of percentile ratios can be obtained even if f < = , I will focus on cases where this restriction holds. Also, note that even if f > = , we think of falling trade costs and skill-biased technical change as important facts in the major industrialized countries in recent decades. Hence, this inequality would tend to be reversed by declines in f and increases in . the total change in inequality following trade integration between ability s 0 and s 00 > s 0 as
where ( ) (s) measures the local change in inequality at ability level s, w (s) = @w (s) =@ and w s (s) = @ 2 w (s) = (@ @s). The local change in inequality is then proportional to the di¤erence between the elasticity to of the marginal price of skills and the total price of skills. The change in the wage ratio between s 0 and s 00 , which can be written as
is positive when trade costs fall if @ @ [w (s 00 ) =w (s 0 )] < 0, so that now ( ) (s) < 0 goes in the direction of increasing local inequality.
Trade integration is a¤ecting wages through two channels, (i ) the reduced marginal cost that exporters face in order to sell abroad, and (ii ) higher competition at home, which tends to reduce revenues on the domestic market and select some managers out of the di¤erentiated sector.
For non-exporters, the selection e¤ect is the only channel active when trade integration occurs.
Using (4.14), simple calculations show that
with g d 2 given in (5.1). As falls, both the wage and the marginal price of skill decrease. However, the marginal price is more responsive (it drops more), since the elasticity of the wage level is reduced by the fact that managers are not getting all the surplus (and in fact, g d 2 (s) < 1): part of the adjustment will occur through pro…ts. Hence, as trade integration occurs, ( ) (s) is positive, and local inequality decreases for all non-exporting managers.
For exporters, di¤erentiation of (4.14) delivers
where g x 2 is given in (5.2). The price e¤ect increases the marginal price of skills (on the left hand side) and the component of the wage coming from the export market (on the right hand side). The former always receives a higher weight, since part of the adjustment on the rent level goes through pro…ts. This force points towards an increase in local inequality.
Under Assumption 1, the selection e¤ect is always pushing
ws(s) upward, in positive territory (recall that @s d =@ < 0), and more than w (s) w(s) : as it happens for domestic sellers, trade integration lowers the price index, puts an upward pressure on real wages of production workers and makes the selection in the manager occupation stricter. This is a force towards the reduction of local inequality.
Overall, the price e¤ect always prevails, and trade integration increases local inequality for exporters.
We can then state the following proposition (proven in Appendix A.4), which states that the unique threshold ability beyond which trade increases local inequality coincides with the exporters' cuto¤ ability, s x . Proposition 3. There exists a unique skill level s ( ) = s x such that the local change in inequality is positive for high abilities and negative for low abilities, i.e., ( ) (s) 0 , s s ( ) .
Under Assumption 1, trade integration is producing increasing dispersion of the wages in the high part of the wage distribution and a compression of wages in the lower part. Evaluating the evolution of wage dispersion in di¤erent regions of the wage distribution is then not su¢cient to disentangle the source of the pattern. Note also that for very closed economies, intra-industry trade cannot have a role in increases in inequality at the bottom (the cuto¤ s x will be relatively high), but it does cause increases in inequality at the top of the distribution.
If f > = , Assumption 1 is not satis…ed, local inequality decreases for both non-exporters and exporters (see proof of Proposition 3), and that the qualitative consequences of skill-biased technical change and trade integration no longer coincide. In this case, the selection e¤ect on w (s) w(s) is receiving a weight so high that the total price of skills is always more sensitive than the marginal price of skills, and local inequality decreases at all levels with trade integration. Assumption 1 is then crucial for trade to imply the same qualitative behavior of skill-biased technical change and its validity is ultimately an empirical question. Note that along a path of skill-biased technical change (increase in ), this assumption tends to be more and more restricitive.
In absence of any information on its validity, we cannot exclude that trade has a role in causing the observed pattern of wage dispersion only on the basis of the wage distribution in the overall economy. I argue in the discussion which follows that intra-…rm rent distribution can provide an alternative source of information which does not rely on Assumption 1.
Intra-Firm Rent Distribution
A larger wage dispersion at the top and smaller wage dispersion at the bottom of the distribution can be caused both by skill-biased technical change and by trade integration, so that information only on the wage distribution is not enough. The following question naturally arises: are there …rm-level outcomes that have a di¤erent response to these two sources of changes in inequality?
And are these responses independent on the validity of Assumption 1? In this simple framework, the answer is yes to both questions.
The rent created in a …rm by a manager and an idea is given by the sum of pro…ts and manager's wage (i.e., the surplus) less their opportunity cost in the alternative occupation. Noting that the assignment (2.5) allows us to write z (s) =z (s d ) = s=s d , we can use the earning functions (4.13) and (4.14) to express the rent for an exporting and a non-exporting …rm as
The share of this rent that goes to managers is then This suggests that a promising avenue for disentangling the two e¤ects is to look at the intra-…rm rent distribution. Firm-level data on employers and employees, properly interpreted, can give us a handle on the evolution of . Changes in inequality not accompanied by changes in the intra-…rm rent distribution must be attributed to trade. Vice-versa, changes in the intra-…rm rent distribution must imply changes in local inequality and wage ratios caused by skill-biased technical change.
A simple way to implement this analysis would be the following. Let the total value added of a …rm ' be V A ('), and denote with W s (') and W u (') the total payments to skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Assume that a …rm with L s (') skilled workers is actually a set of L s (') production lines, i.e., each skilled worker would be a manager. The surplus v (') in the model is thenv (') (V A (') W u (')) =L s ('). To move from the surplus to the rent, we must have an estimate of the opportunity cost of the skilled workers: we can use the wage of an unskilled worker in the same …rm,ŵ u (') W u (') =L u (') : Hence, the average rent in a …rm isv (') ŵ u ('), and the share of this rent going to the "manager" would be estimated tô
is the average wage for skilled workers. It is easy to show that for^ (') 2 (0; 1), we need that the wage per skilled worker is larger than the wage per unskilled worker and that there are some payments to capital 22 .
The model would predict that this share is constant across …rms, and is not a¤ected by trade integration, so that changes in the average over time would measure the intensity of skill-biased technical change.
Conclusion
I have shown how changes in local inequality determine the behavior of wage ratios across the ability spectrum. Although through partially di¤erent channels, local inequality responds in similar ways to both skill-biased technical change and trade integration: both shocks have asymmetric e¤ects across …rms, raising the competitive pressure on low productivity …rms and favoring …rms at the high end of the productivity range, which are also the …rms which employ higher skilled managers.
Hence, skill-biased technical change and trade integration can -under appropriate parameters'
restrictions -both reproduce divergent patterns of wage ratios in the lower and the upper tail of the wage distribution, and increasing ratios at all levels in the upper tail, thus being consistent with the evidence on wage inequality in the last 50 years in the United States. I acknowledge that this model is still too stylized in many respects, …rst of all the one-to-one matching assumption, to attempt a serious quanti…cation of the importance of these two mechanisms; however, it has the virtue of uncovering the link between micro-level behavior and the aggregate evolution of wage ratios, and emphasize potential relations among observable …rm-level outcomes and two of the most important and studied macro-economic changes in (at least) the last half century. With more articulated frameworks, estimates of the evolution of intra-…rm rent distribution, possibly based on the use of employer-employee matched data sets, can put (at least) a bound on the degree of skill-biased technical change, and help disentangle the size of each channel.
I leave this for future research. 2 2 Note that, substituting the de…nitions given in the text,^ (') Ws(')=Ls(') Wu(')=Lu(') (V A(') Wu('))=Ls(') Wu(')=Lu (') . Assume that the numerator in^ (') is positive (i.e., the average wage for skilled workers is larger than the average wage for unskilled workers); then the estimated share will be smaller than 1 as long as
i.e., as long as there are some payment to capital. If this is true, then it is also su¢cient for^ (') to be positive, since the requirement would be V A (') =Ls (') > Wu (') (1=Lu (') + 1=Lu (')) () V A (') >ŵu (') (Ls (') + Lu (')).
A Proof of Results
A.1 The Local Change in Inequality
For two ability levels s 00 > s 0 , we want to study the direction of the change in w (s 00 ) =w (s 0 ) as increases. Denote with w (s) the derivative of the wage function with respect to , and with
w (s) =w (s) the point elasticity of the wage. Then, the elasticity of the wage ratio with respect to , call it " (s 0 ; s 00 ), is simply " (s 00 ) " (s 0 ). Since the choice of the percentiles (and then the abilities) is arbitrary, it is convenient to express this elasticity as
The elasticity of the wage with respect to generally varies with the ability level: the function @" (s) =@s describes this dependence. Moreover, its sign will determine if the local contribution of the ability level s is to increase or decrease all the wage ratios that contain it. Calculating @"(s) @s explicitly,
where w s (s) is the marginal wage at s and w s (s) is the cross-partial derivative of the wage function with respect to and s: The sign of ( ) (s) is what matters to determine the direction of the local change in inequality.
A.2 Skill-Biased Technical Change in Closed Economy
Recall that eq. (3.1) de…nes ( ) (s)
w(s) : Di¤erentiating (2.14) with respect to , multiplying by =w (s), and normalizing w to 1, we have 
A.3 Skill-Biased Technical Change in Open Economy
The elasticity of wage to skill is now a piecewise function of the form To show that each of these three cases can actually occur, suppose f = 1. Then, lim !1 lhs ( ) < 0, lim !1 rhs d ( ) = lim !1 rhs x ( ) = 0. Since, as ! 1, lhs ( ) goes monotonically to +1 while both rhs functions go monotonically to 1 , lhs ( ) will cross once rhs x ( ) and then rhs d ( ) from below. In this construction, moving from autarky (+1) to perfect integration ( = 1) will let the economies visit case (ii), (iii) and …nally (i).
A.4 Trade Integration
Recall that, di¤erentiating (4.14) for domestic sellers, and using j (s) (s=s d ) (1 + f ) > 0 , f < Hence, local inequality increases for exporters as trade barriers fall if and only if f < = :
